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@article{Erat2010WhiteL, title={White lies}, author={Sanjiv Erat and Uri Gneezy}, journal={Manag. Sci.}, year={2010}, volume={58}, pages={723-733}, url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:53235445}}
  • Sanjiv Erat, U. Gneezy
  • Published in Management Sciences 14 May 2010
  • Economics

It is found that women are more likely to tell an altruistic lie, but tend to tell fewer Pareto lies, and women are less likely than men to lie when it is costly to the other side.

156 Citations

Highly Influential Citations

8

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Results Citations

4

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  • 2005

Deception is part of many economic interactions. Business people, politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and students in the experimental laboratory who make use of private information do not always do so

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An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
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